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The end of the Cold War in  1989 heralded in the drafting of a new wave of 
constitutions, particularly in post-conflict states, as many Cold-War-related conflicts 
came to a gradual end. Since this time, more than 110 constitutions have been written 
or revised1 — and one discernible global trend in this process of constitutional reform 
has been to entrench the right to equality between men and women as a constitutional 
principle.2 This widespread acceptance of gender equality as an international norm of 
constitutionalism is in large part due to pressure from the international community 
as well as the influence of international and regional human rights treaties generally.3 
1 Susan H Williams, 'Introduction: Comparative Constitutional Law, Gender Equality and 
Constitutional Design' in Susan H Williams (ed), Constituting Equality: Gender Equality and Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 1.
2 To date, 139 constitutions guarantee gender equality. See Laura Turquet et al, Progress of the World's 
Women: In Pursuit of Justice (UN Women, 2011) 24.
3 See, for example, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
opened for signature 18  December  1979, 1249  UNTS  13 (entered into force 3  September  1981) 
('CEDAW') art 2; Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa (adopted by the Meeting of Ministers 28 March 2003, and the Assembly of the African Union 
21 July 2003), art 2. Both these treaties specifically direct state parties to incorporate the principle of 
equality into their constitutions.
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At the same time, constitution making has become increasingly participatory and 
inclusive and less understood as a process for elite groups. In this period, the United 
Nations (UN), mostly through the work of peacekeeping missions authorised by the 
UN Security Council,4 has assisted many post-conflict states such as Timor-Leste, 
Afghanistan and Nepal with the process of drafting their constitutions. This assistance 
has included support with public participation programmes and, in some more recent 
cases, encouraging women's inclusion in the constitution-making process.
The year  1989 also marks the beginning of Judith Gardam's pioneering 
work into feminist approaches to international humanitarian law,5 which has led to 
the UN Security Council's unfolding Women, Peace and Security  (WPS) agenda. 
Along with peers such as Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, with whom 
she ventured in 1989,6 Gardam is at the vanguard of feminist legal scholarship in 
international law: together, in the passing of a quarter of a century, they have led 
the way in highlighting, challenging and even shifting important paradigms facing 
women in conflict and post-conflict settings, many of which had previously seemed 
largely invisible and intractable.
There are a number of paradigms operating in the post-conflict context which 
have a significant effect on the lives of women. First and foremost is the cultural 
and social pressure to perform the 'patriotic duty' of reconstituting the state through 
childbearing. For example, five years after independence, in  2007, Timor-Leste 
had the highest fertility rate in the world. A decade on since independence, each 
Timorese woman has on average six live births in her lifetime; as at 2012, Afghan 
women have five.7 In post-conflict states, this patriotic duty poses serious risks: the 
maternal mortality rates in post-conflict states such as Timor-Leste and Afghanistan 
are respectively triple and double the average for the Asia-Pacific region.8 For women 
in post-conflict states, childbearing and childrearing duties are borne in difficult 
4 These include Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo, 
Cote-d'Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Iraq, Kosovo, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste and Tunisia.
5 Judith Gardam, 'A Feminist Analysis of Certain Aspects of International Humanitarian Law' (1989) 
12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 265.
6 Hilary Charlesworth, 'The Public/Private Distinction and the Right to Development in International 
Law' (1989) 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 190; Christine Chinkin, 'A Gendered 
Perspective to the International Use of Force' (1989) 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 279.
7 Afghanistan and Timor-Leste have by far the highest rates of live births per woman, with 
Timor-Leste's rate triple that of the regional average and Afghanistan more than double. Not surprisingly, 
both post-conflict states have the lowest rate of contraceptive prevalence in the Asia-Pacific region. See 
UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific ('ESCAP'), 'Statistical Yearbook for Asia 




environments where state services are scarce, given the fragility and embryonic nature 
of the state.9
A second paradigm for women in post-conflict settings is that violence against 
women is often heightened. According to Megan Bastick, Karin Grimm and Rahel 
Kunz, 'a number of countries emerging from armed conflict report a very high and/
or increasing incidence of criminal and family violence, including sexual and other 
forms of violence against women'.10 The UN Committee for the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee) argues that 
this escalation of gender-based violence in post-conflict states has a knock-on effect 
in that it 'undermine[s] women's equal and meaningful participation in political and 
public life'.11 Such violence and intimidation often overshadow women's participation 
in constitution-making processes. For example, 70 per cent of women participating 
in Nepal's first Constituent Assembly (2008-12), established to draft Nepal's 
Constitution, reported facing violence as a result of their participation in politics.12 
In Afghanistan, women delegates were welcomed to the 2004 Constitutional Loya 
Jirga by the following statement made by the Chairman: 'Don't try to put yourself 
on the same level with men … God has not given you equal rights … [T]wo women 
are counted as equal to one man'.13 Cultural attitudes regarding the roles of women in 
society, combined with significant domestic responsibilities and high rates of violence 
and intimidation, mean that women face numerous obstacles in participating in 
public forums, especially high-profile forums where the political stakes are high, such 
as constitution-making forums.
9 Ibid 115, 17. As at 2012, half of Timor-Leste's population was living below the national poverty 
line. More than 70 per cent of the population lives in rural areas in both Timor-Leste and Afghanistan.
10 Megan Bastick, Karin Grimm and Rahel Kunz, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Global Overview 
and Implications for the Security Sector (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 
2007) 15. Such surveys support the statement made by the CEDAW Committee in regard to the 
challenges facing women in post-conflict states: 'For most women in post-conflict environments, the 
violence does not stop with the official ceasefire or the signing of the peace agreement and often increases 
in the post-conflict setting … [A]ll forms of gender-based violence, in particular sexual violence, escalate 
in the post-conflict setting'. CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict 
prevention, conflict and post‑conflict situations, 47th sess, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/30 (18 October 2013) 
[35].
11 Ibid [37].
12 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance  et  al., Women Members of the 
Constituent Assembly: A Summary of a Study on Contribution of Women in Constitution Making in 
Nepal (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Women's Caucus, Constituent 
Assembly Secretariat, Nepal Law Society, 2013) 53.
13 Opening Statement quoted in Mir Hermatullah Sadat, 'The Implementation of Constitutional 
Human Rights in Afghanistan' (2004) 11(2) Human Rights Brief 48, 48.
222
IMAGINING LAW
Constitution-making promises change: it is a time for 'big questions' to be 
raised because it is a moment in which the foundation and ground rules for the 
state as well as the legal system are designed. Until the 1970s, constitutions were 
predominantly drafted by elite groups of men. Since this time, the paradigm of 
constitution making has shifted to be more inclusive, participatory, representative 
and transparent. In post-conflict settings, women increasingly understand the 
promise of the constitution-making process as a means of social and cultural change 
and hence they are ever more calling on constitutions to address endemic problems 
in their daily lives such as domestic violence. While the international community has 
been successful in encouraging the widespread constitutional entrenchment of the 
principle of the equality of men and women, this has not been translated into a clear 
articulation that women's equal and meaningful participation in constitution-making 
processes is necessary to ensure the 'creat[ion  of ] a common vision of the future 
of a state',14 particularly in post-conflict states where finding a common vision is 
especially critical and fraught. Sharing a role in designing the ground rules by which 
a state should operate in the future is an important step toward substantive equality 
for women in post-conflict states, as it opens up the possibility of addressing and 
changing structures of inequality.
In the twenty-first century, there is a widely held view that for new constitutions 
to enjoy democratic legitimacy they must be the product of some process of public 
participation process that reflects the composition of the population. For this reason, 
women are increasingly demanding that they make up approximately 50 per  cent 
of constitutional drafters and those consulted. This was one of the first demands 
of a  2011 Egyptian Women's Charter, drawn up by local women's  NGOs: that 
women 'be represented in the committee that will be entrusted with drafting the 
constitution' and that this representation be in proportion to women's makeup of 
the population as well as 'their past, present and future role in building the society'.15 
Unfortunately, no women were included on Egypt's Expert Committee, which 
prepared recommendations on constitutional amendments, while women and youth 
shared only 10  per  cent of reserved seats on Egypt's fifty-member Constitutional 
Committee. In contrast, in 2011, women in Tunisia gained about a quarter of all 
seats in its National Constituent Assembly, a number which analysts say represents 
the largest proportion of female representatives in the Arab world.16 In large part, this 
14 UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, 'Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations 
Assistance to Constitution-Making Processes' (Guidance Note, April 2009) 3.
15 See Alliance for Arab Women and the Egyptian Women's Coalition, Egyptian Women's Charter: 
Partners in the Revolution and in Building Democratic Egypt (July 2011) <http://www.unwomen.org/~/
media/Headquarters/Media/Stories/en/charteregyptianwomenenpdf.pdf>.




was thanks to an election law that stipulated parity for women on electoral lists as well 
as a mixed proportional election system. In late 2013, Tunisia's National Constituent 
Assembly successfully finalised the country's new constitution, a document which has 
been described as a progressive step for women's rights in the Arab world.
In 2013, the UN Secretary-General claimed that UN entities have provided 
support for women's participation in constitution-making processes,17 referring 
no doubt to UN  activities in Egypt, Tunisia and Nepal, where the UN  has been 
supporting women members to participate in constitution-making bodies as 
well as assisting civil society in engaging with these bodies through, for example, 
preparing women's charters. As this chapter argues, despite the UN's activities, one 
of the difficulties in encouraging women's increased participation in constitution 
making is that few UN bodies have clearly articulated women's right to participate 
in constitution making. For example, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), 
which began the Security Council's WPS agenda, speaks broadly and vaguely about 
women's 'full and equal' participation in post-conflict decision making, but none 
of the WPS resolutions which have followed have gone so far as the UN CEDAW 
Committee which, in 2013, explicitly articulated the need for women's 'equal and 
meaningful' participation in post-conflict constitution making.
In the Asia-Pacific region, the rate of women's formal participation in political 
institutions is surprisingly high in post-conflict states such as Afghanistan, Nepal 
and Timor-Leste: as at 2012, Nepal and Timor-Leste respectively have the highest 
proportion of women participating in national parliaments in the region, with 
Afghanistan not far behind, largely due to gender quotas imposed either through 
legislation or constitutional provisions.18 This proportion of women in parliament far 
exceeds the world average of 21 per cent.19 This is consistent with UN data showing 
that transitional countries represent a third of all countries that have achieved at least 
33 per cent women's representation in parliament.20 In the first decade of the early 
17 Measures Taken and Progress Achieved in the Promotion of Women and Political Participation — Report 
of the Secretary‑General, 68th sess, Provisional Agenda Item 28, UN Doc A/68/184 (24 July 2013) [33].
18 Nepal 33  per  cent, Timor-Leste 32  per  cent and Afghanistan 28  per  cent: ESCAP, 'Statistical 
Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2013' (Statistical Yearbook, ESCAP, 3 December 2013) 160. Both 
Nepal and Timor-Leste have legislated quotas: Constituent Assembly Ordinance 2013 (Nepal); Law on 
the Elections of the National Parliament 2006 (Timor-Leste) as amended in 2011. The Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan arts 83, 84 entrench gender quotas.
19 Measures Taken and Progress Achieved in the Promotion of Women and Political Participation — Report 
of the Secretary‑General, 68th sess, Provisional Agenda Item 28, UN Doc A/68/184 (24 July 2013) 5, 
Figure 1.
20 Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on The Issue of Discrimination against Women 
in Law and in Practice, 23rd sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/23/50 (19 April 2013), fn 19. In 
terms of women's share in ministerial positions, Timor-Leste is second in the region with 23 per cent, 
which exceeds the world average of 17 per cent. In Nepal, women make up 16 per cent of the Ministry, 
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twenty-first century, all three post-conflict states received constitutional assistance 
from the UN: Timor-Leste (2001-02), Afghanistan (2002-04) and Nepal (2008-14). 
While the rate of women's participation in constitution making has varied in each 
country, it is useful to examine the constitutional assistance offered by the UN and to 
assess its impact on women's inclusion in these constitution-making processes.
In this volume celebrating Professor Gardam's work, I examine whether 
international norms extend to a right of women to participate in post-conflict 
constitution-making processes. I trace the emergence of international norms relating 
to women's participation in constitution making in post-conflict states and analyse 
the international practice, particularly in regard to UN  constitutional assistance. 
This chapter begins with an example of women's equal participation in constitution 
making, found in South Africa in the early 1990s, and it uses this example to sketch 
some of the tensions and trends apparent in participatory constitution making. It 
maps out the UN approach to encouraging women's participation in constitution 
making by analysing both UN documents and UN practice as seen in Timor-Leste, 
Afghanistan, and Nepal. It observes an increasing acceptance of using temporary 
special measures and calibrating electoral systems to be 'gender-responsive', so that 
more women can participate in elected constitution-drafting bodies, as well as an 
understanding that where political elites have a role in constitution-making bodies, 
elite women must also be appointed.
Given the frequency of constitutional reform in the post-Cold War era and the 
potential of such processes to assist in transforming post-conflict states, it is necessary 
that the international community clearly articulate women's right to participate in 
constitution-making processes. In the past, the focus has been solely on post-conflict 
elections rather than on facilitating women's participation in long-term, foundational 
design. Women need to have a role in shaping institutions and structures, rather 
than simply participating in parliaments when the ground rules have already been 
drawn up.
womEn's PartiCiPation in Post‑ConfLiCt Constitution makinG
New Constitutionalism: Equal and Meaningful Participation and 
Democratic Processes
At the beginning of the post-Cold-War era, for the first (and perhaps only) time 
in modern constitution making, women's equal participation was achieved via 
South Africa's post-apartheid constitution-making process. 'South Africa is the first 
country in which a constitution-making body has consisted of an equal number of 
while in Afghanistan this figure is 12 per cent: see ESCAP, 'Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 
2013' (Statistical Yearbook, ESCAP, 3 December 2013) 161.
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men and women.'21 This may not surprise many commentators given that, of all 
constitution-making processes in the post-Cold-War era, South Africa's has received 
the most praise.
But it is important to pause before hailing this as a huge milestone: while this 
body was involved in drafting South Africa's first post-apartheid constitution, the 
1994 Interim Constitution, it did not draft the much celebrated 1996 Constitution, 
which was drafted through an elected body. South Africa's Interim Constitution 
of 1994 was a result of negotiations and minimal democratic legitimacy; in other 
words, the process in which women enjoyed 'equal participation' was an elite 
process.22 In South Africa's first democratic elections in  1994, which elected the 
Constituent Assembly that drafted the 1996 Final Constitution, women won slightly 
under a quarter of the seats. However, the 1994 Interim Constitution was important, 
as it set out 34 constitutional principles, including guarantees of gender equality, with 
which the 1996 Final Constitution had to comply before receiving official certification 
by the Constitutional Court.23 Thus the only experience to date of women's 'equal 
participation' in constitution making, in terms of the number of delegates at the 
Negotiating Council, has been through an elite process that did not directly lead to 
the democratic constitution that South Africans enjoy today, although it did lay the 
critical foundations of that constitution. Furthermore, the international community 
offered little direct constitutional assistance in this process and, in particular, the 
UN had no direct involvement.
South Africa's 1996 Constitution is praised worldwide as having played a key 
role in the country's successful transition to democracy. And yet its constitution-making 
process shows that a mix of elected bodies and elite bodies was involved — a factor 
often forgotten. This mix sits in tension with the twenty-first-century drive for a 
more inclusive, participatory, representative and transparent process of constitution 
making.24 The shift from political elites to an inclusive process is often attributed in 
part to the broader trend of democratisation that has swept around the world since 
21 Heinz Klug, 'Participating in the Design: Constitution-Making in South Africa' in Penelope 
Andrews and Stephen Ellmann (eds), Post‑Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa's Basic 
Laws (Witwatersrand University Press, Ohio University Press, 2001) 128, 142.
22 Women's equal participation as delegates was only made possible through extensive lobbying 
by civil society: see ibid. See also, in particular, Catherine Albertyn, 'Women and the Transition to 
Democracy in South Africa' in Christina Murray (ed), Gender and the New South African Legal Order 
(Juta, 1994) 39, 54-7.
23 Klug, above n 21, 128. According to Klug, women's equal participation in South Africa's interim 
constitution-making process was achieved by the lobbying of civil society through a multi-party 
Women's National Coalition and, more specifically, the ANC's Women's League.




the end of the Cold War, a trend which has led to increasing demands for inclusion 
and participation by marginalised groups. This participatory form of constitution 
making has been dubbed 'new constitutionalism' by Vivien Hart in her seminal 
report on participatory constitution making.25 Under traditional constitutionalism, 
constitution making was considered an act of completion to be performed by elites so 
as to ensure future stability.26 Under new constitutionalism, the process of constitution 
making is critical in order for the constitution to attain legitimacy on the domestic 
and international fronts. In Hart's view, this process is 'conversational' in that it is 
conducted 'by all concerned, open to new entrants and issues, seeking a workable 
formula that will be sustainable rather than assuredly stable'.27
In the post-conflict context, participatory processes offer many benefits: they 
assist in forging reconciliation through facilitating societal dialogue, and they may 
lead to lasting peace through building a shared vision of the future of the state. Such 
processes are considered to lead to greater empowerment of the population, as they 
can be a means of kickstarting an increase in participation in political life of various 
formerly marginalised sections of society such as women.28 Elizabeth Katz argues 
that 'women's participation substantively changes constitutional text, brings unique 
and often taboo issues into the national spotlight [such as divorce and abortion], 
and empowers women participants'.29 This is consistent with a study of twelve 
constitution-making processes in the post-Cold-War era, conducted by the Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance  (IDEA), which claims that participatory 
processes 'tended to result in constitutional drafts which provided rights to those 
groups which had not up to then gained political protection or recognition, and 
addressed issues of social and economic justice'.30 Furthermore, the use of such 
processes 'were shown to broaden the constitutional agenda'.31
In  2007, in the early days of Nepal's constitution-making process, the 




28 Kirsti Samuels, 'Constitution Building Processes and Democratization: A Discussion of Twelve 
Case Studies' (Second Draft, International IDEA — Democracy-Building and Conflict Management, 
2006) 11.
29 Elizabeth Katz, 'Women's Involvement in International Constitution-Making' in Beverley Baines, 
Daphne Barak-Erez and Tsvi Kahana (eds), Feminist Constitutionalism: Global Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) 204, 205.
30 Kirsti Samuels, 'Constitution Building Processes and Democratization: A Discussion of Twelve 





that the constitution-making process offers the 'foundation for a more inclusive 
democratic system able to address the country's persistent problems of social 
exclusion'.32 Furthermore, he articulated the high hopes riding on this participatory 
process:
The Constituent Assembly is seen as the opportunity to create a 'new Nepal', 
and both the election that determines representation in this body and the 
constitution-making process that follows must be fashioned in such a way that 
those Nepalese who have too often been without a voice will be heard.33
The mantra of inclusion, participation and transparency is not the whole story for new 
constitutionalism. Hart reminded us that 'constitution making is essentially about 
the distribution of power', which means that political elites find ways to control the 
process, as is shown through South Africa's example.34 This tension between political 
elites and participatory processes is highlighted by the IDEA  report, which states 
that where political elites feel that a participatory process threatens established power 
structures, their reaction has been to undermine the constitution, to amend it, or to 
prevent its adoption, implementation or enforcement.35 While these power dynamics 
provide something of an antidote to the romanticism that could be attributed to the 
participatory drive of new constitutionalism, they do not counter the need for broad 
participation in constitution-making processes. These factors need to be weighed by 
those actors who exert influence over the design of constitution-making processes in 
post-conflict states.
In 2003, Hart argued that in this paradigm of new constitutionalism 'a right 
to participate in making a constitution' has emerged, and that it has both a moral 
and legal foundation. By moral foundation, Hart was referring to to international 
norms of democracy. The legal foundation of an emerging right to participate in 
constitution making begins with Article  25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which provides: 'Every citizen shall have the 
right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 
[such as sex] … : (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
32 Report of the Secretary‑General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in Support of its 
Peace Process, UN Doc S/2007/7 (9 January 2007) [8]. At least in its discourse, the UN has invested 
heavily in the promise of new constitutionalism, as is illustrated, for example, by the naming of the 
UN Development Programme's (UNDP) 'Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal'.
33 Ibid [20].
34 Vivien Hart, Democratic Constitution Making (Special Report No 107, United States Institute of 
Peace, July 2003) 9.
35 Kirsti Samuels, 'Constitution Building Processes and Democratization: A Discussion of Twelve 




freely chosen representatives'.36 The UN  Human Rights Committee  (HRC) has 
interpreted these words broadly to include constitution making, by stating: 'Citizens 
also participate directly in the conduct of public affairs when they choose or change 
their constitution'.37 Given the non-discrimination principle articulated in Article 2 
of the ICCPR, this right to participate in choosing or changing the constitution is 
clearly to be enjoyed equally by women.
CEDAW adds to this legal foundation, although it does not use the same 
phrase as the  ICCPR and its language is narrower.38 Under Article 7 of CEDAW, 
states parties are required to
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the 
political and public life of the country and, in particular, shall ensure to women, 
on equal terms with men, the right: … (b) To participate in the formulation of 
government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and 
perform all public functions at all levels of government.39
The initial  1997 jurisprudence of the CEDAW Committee did not interpret this 
provision to specifically include constitution-making processes,40 although it states 
that 'the obligation specified in article 7 extends to all areas of public and political 
life and is not limited to those areas specified' in the subparagraphs.41 Furthermore, 
the CEDAW Committee advises that Article 7 should be read in conjunction with 
Article  25 of the ICCPR and the HRC's jurisprudence, mentioned above. Thus 
while CEDAW does not explicitly state that women have the right to participate in 
constitution-making processes, the CEDAW Committee recognised the scope for 
such an interpretation. This shows that, as at 2003, when Hart claimed that a right to 
36 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19  December  1966, 
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) (emphasis added).
37 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public 
Affairs and the Right to Vote) The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the Right of Equal 
Access to Public Service, 57th sess, 1510the mtg, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996) [6].
38 Since the 1940s and 1950s, women's political rights have been a matter of UN attention, culminating 
in the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, adopted by the UN  General Assembly in  1952 
(Convention on the Political Rights of Women), opened for signature 31 March 1953, 193 UNTS 135 
(entered into force 7 July 1954), and CEDAW, adopted by the General Assembly in 1972. The former 
focused narrowly on women's entitlement to vote and hold public office and eligibility for election to 
all publicly elected bodies.
39 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature 
18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981) (emphasis added).
40 Only CEDAW,  art  2 refers to constitutions in stating that states parties agree to 'condemn 
discrimination against women  …  and, to this end, undertake: (a)  To embody the principle of the 
equality of men and women in their national constitutions'.




participate in constitution making had emerged, there was scope to argue that a right 
of women to participate in constitution making was emerging, although, as shown 
below, it was not until a decade later that the CEDAW Committee articulated this 
right.
With these moral and legal foundations in mind, it is useful to turn to consider 
the constitutional assistance offered by the international community, in particular 
the UN, since the beginning of the twenty-first century. This assistance has had a 
significant impact on such constitution-making processes in post-conflict states 
across the world.
UN Constitutional Assistance and International Norms
The era of 'new constitutionalism' coincides with the trend of international 
constitutional assistance for post-conflict states. The constitutional assistance offered 
by the international community understandably has an agenda that often reflects 
the assistance provider's sometimes idiosyncratic conception of regional and global 
security. One widely accepted means to achieving such security is encouraging 
regional and global compliance with international norms such as democracy, the rule 
of law and human rights.42 This means that constitutional assistance is designed, at 
least in part, to encourage a process which would further such international norms 
and ease the entry of failed or fragile post-conflict states towards membership of the 
international community. Two examples of this ritual of entry are the ratification 
of human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR and CEDAW, and the constitutional 
entrenchment of core principles such as gender equality.
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has led the constitutional assistance 
being offered to post-conflict states such as Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Nepal. This 
highlights the importance of those international norms being produced by UN bodies 
in relation to constitution making. Beginning with Namibia and Cambodia in the 
early 1990s, the UN has provided constitutional assistance as part of peacekeeping 
missions and political missions authorised by the UN Security Council in almost 
two dozen post-conflict states. Indeed, the UN  claims that 'UN  engagement 
in and assistance to constitution-making increasingly is a core component of the 
Organization's peacebuilding and state-building strategy'.43
42 See, for example, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe (Paris, 19-21 November 1990); Danilo Turk, 'Recognition of States: A Comment' (1993) 4 
European Journal of International Law 66.
43 UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, 'Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations 
Assistance to Constitution-Making Processes' (Guidance Note, April 2009) 3.
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Within the  UN, the UN  Development Programme  (UNDP) has led most 
direct constitutional assistance projects in post-conflict states, including support to 
women candidates and women members of drafting bodies. For example, in 2013 
in Tunisia, UNDP set up workshops to support women candidates contesting the 
elections to the National Constituent Assembly (NCA); and, following the elections, 
it trained elected members on how to hold public consultations, and supported a 
national dialogue on drafting the new constitution. UN Women and its predecessor 
UNIFEM have also been involved in constitutional assistance, but their approach is 
more indirect. They have assisted women's NGOs to advocate for gender-responsive 
electoral systems and supported them to engage with, and make contributions 
to, constitution-drafting bodies such as Tunisia's  NCA, often through preparing 
women's charters. For example, prior to  2011, UNIFEM worked with women's 
groups in Ecuador (2006-07) and in Nepal (2007-10) to bear indirect influence on 
constitution making and to advocate for electoral quotas for women.
To understand the  UN's approach to constitution making, it is useful to 
consider a series of Guidance Notes of the Secretary General, which are aimed at 
offering 'strategic guidance' to UN  bodies and agencies in their efforts as part of 
UN missions. The 2009 Guidance Note on Assistance to Constitution‑Making Processes 
acknowledges the ad hoc nature of past UN constitutional assistance and it aims to 
offer coherent guidance for all UN agencies as to 'how to support national actors 
during the design and implementation of a constitution-making exercise'.44 The 
Note sets out six principles on the drafting and contents of constitutions, such as 
to '[e]ncourage compliance with international norms and standards'.45 While 
the principles relating to process include '[s]upport inclusivity, participation and 
transparency', they do not explicitly encompass any articulation of women's right to 
fully participate in the drafting process.46
44 Ibid 3.
45 Ibid  1 (Guiding Principle  No  2). In  2014, UNDP published the UNDP Guidance Note on 
Constitution‑Making Support, which 'aims to provide a framework for the application' of the six 
principles articulated in the 2009 Guidance Note on Assistance to Constitution-Making Processes, p 7.
46 Note that the UN Guidance Note on the Rule of Law sets out that a framework for strengthening the 
rule of law includes '[a]n electoral system, which, inter alia … [a]ssures the right of everyone to take part 
in the government of his or her country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives, including 
through the application of temporary special measures'. (See UN  Secretary-General Ban-Ki  Moon, 
'Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making Processes' 
(Guidance Note, April 2009) 6.) The trifecta of inclusiveness, participation and transparency found in 
the 2009 Guidance Note echoes the advice of four constitutional experts, who authored Interpeace's 
Constitution‑Making Handbook, all of whom have experience in providing constitutional assistance in a 
series of post-conflict settings. However, unlike the UN Note on Constitution-Making, the Handbook 
specifically recognises the importance of gender equity on constitution making, in particular ensuring 
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While women's inclusion in the constitution-making process appears to be 
a blindspot in the UN's 2009 Guidance Note on Assistance to Constitution‑Making 
Processes, in strong contrast, the UN Guidance Note on Democracy (2009) makes special 
mention of the need for women's participation in democracy building and the need 
to 'explicitly address the effects of discrimination against women' which 'contributes 
to women's exclusion and the marginalization of their concerns'.47 Furthermore, the 
Note 'recogniz[es] the centrality of constitution-making to democratic transitions', 
but it stops short of spelling out that the gender discrimination which 'prevents 
women from engaging effectively in democratic processes' equally impedes women 
from participating in constitution making.48
Another relevant stream of international norms relate to women, conflict 
and peace agreements. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, coinciding 
with the period in which the UN has ramped up its constitutional assistance, the 
UN  Security Council has become 'the primary norm-producing site on issues of 
women and armed conflict'49 through its Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda 
which, from 2000-14, includes seven Security Council resolutions, beginning with 
Resolution  1325 in  2000.50 These resolutions are primarily aimed at protecting 
women during armed conflict and encouraging women's full participation in the 
writing of peace agreements; unfortunately, the complexities of the post-conflict 
setting appear largely tangential to the WPS agenda. Resolution 1325 stresses 'the 
importance of [women's] equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for 
the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their 
role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution'.51 While it 
addresses women's participation in post-conflict decision making, which implicitly 
includes constitution making, as constitutions generally aim to avert conflict and 
women's full participation 'at all stages' (see Michele Brandt, Jill Cottrell, Yash Ghai and Anthony Regan, 
Constitution‑Making and Reform: Options for the Process (Handbook, Interpeace, 9 September 2011) 10).
47 UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, 'Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations 
Assistance to Constitution-Making Processes' (Guidance Note, April 2009) 4.
48 Ibid 6.
49 Aisling Swaine, 'Substantive New Normative Provisions on Women and Armed Conflict 
Concurrently Adopted by the UN  Security Council and the CEDAW Committee' (2014) 18(5) 
American Society of International Law 2.
50 SC  Res  1325, UN  SCOR, 55th  sess, 4213th  mtg, UN  Doc  S/RES/1325 (31  October  2000); 
SC Res 1820, UN SCOR, 63rd sess, 5916th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1820 (19 June 2008): SC Res 1888, 
UN  SCOR, 64th  sess, 6195th  mtg, UN  Doc  S/RES/1888 (30  September  2009); SC  Res  1889, 
UN SCOR, 64th sess, 6196th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1889 (5 October 2009); SC Res 1960, UN SCOR, 
65th sess, 6453rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1960 (16 December 2010); SC Res 2106, UN SCOR, 68th sess, 
6984th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/2106 (24 June 2013); SC Res 2122, UN SCOR, 68th sess, 7044th mtg, 
UN Doc S/RES/2122 (18 October 2013).
51 SC Res 1325, UN SCOR, 4213th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000).
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to secure peace,52 it does not explicitly refer to the process of constitution making. 
Constitutions are explicitly mentioned only obliquely in Resolution 1325 in regard 
to the need to protect women's human rights through various mechanisms including 
constitutions.53
The 2013 WPS Security Council Resolution 2122, which focuses on women's 
leadership, comes tantalisingly close to articulating the need for women's full and 
equal participation in constitutional processes. In it, the Security Council
[s]tresses the importance of those Member States conducting post-conflict 
electoral processes and constitutional reform continuing their efforts, with support 
from United Nations entities, to ensure women's full and equal participation in 
all phases of electoral processes, noting that specific attention must be paid to 
women's safety prior to, and during, elections.54
This omission of women's full and equal participation in constitutional reform is 
curious, given that the issue was raised in a 2002 study entitled Women, Peace and Security 
submitted by the UN Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 1325, which states: 
'Constitutional reform processes during [post-conflict] reconstruction should include 
the participation of women and take account of gender perspectives'.55 Furthermore, 
at the end of 2011, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on Women and 
Political Participation which encourages states to ensure an expanded role for women 
in peacebuilding efforts in line with the SC's WPS resolutions,56 and, to further this 
purpose, it encourages states to appoint women to 'bodies responsible for designing 
constitutional … reforms'.57 Indeed, if one refers to the Guidelines of UN Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations in regard to post-conflict electoral process, it is possible 
to find some specific advice: 'Make sure that women are included on constitutional 
drafting committees'.58 Despite this, the UNSC's  WPS  resolutions fall short of 
52 While constitutions can be part of peace processes, the prevailing view is that the two should not 
be conflated — see Jamal Benomar, Constitution‑Making and Peace Building: Lessons Learned from the 
Constitution‑Making Processes of Post‑Conflict Countries (UNDP, August 2003) 3.
53 SC Res 1325, UN SCOR, 4213th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000) [8(c)].
54 SC Res 1325, UN SCOR, 4213th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000) [8] (emphasis 
added).
55 Christine Chinkin, 'Peace Agreements as a Means for Promoting Gender Equality and Ensuring 
Participation of Women' (Background Paper for Expert Group Meeting on 'Peace Agreements as a 
Means for Promoting Gender Equality and Ensuring Participation of Women — A Framework of 
Model Provisions', UN Division for the Advancement of Women, 31 October 2003) 112.
56 Women and Political Participation, GA  Res  66/130, UN  GAOR, 66th  sess, Agenda Item  28(a), 
UN Doc A/RES/66/130 (19 March 2012) [7].
57 Ibid [8] (emphasis added).
58 Gabrielle Russo, DPKO/DFS — DPA Joint Guidelines on Women in Post‑Conflict Electoral 




directly advocating that women have a right to participate in constitution-building 
processes and the reason for this gap is not clear.
A couple of months after Resolution 2122 in 2013, CEDAW issued a general 
comment on women and post-conflict settings, which articulated the gap in the 
WPS  agenda. It states: 'During the constitution-drafting process, the equal and 
meaningful participation of women is fundamental for the inclusion of constitutional 
guarantees of women's rights'.59 In this, it frames women's participation as a 
policy outcome rather than as a matter of access. The CEDAW Committee broadly 
attempts to pin its source on Articles 1-5(a), 7 and 15 of CEDAW as well as, more 
tangentially, the WPS  agenda, stating: 'The importance of a gender perspective 
in post-conflict electoral and constitutional reform is also emphasized in Security 
Council resolution 1325 (2000)'.60 Overall, the Committee recommends that states 
parties '[e]nsure women's equal participation in constitution-drafting processes 
and adopt gender-sensitive mechanisms for public participation and input into 
constitution-drafting processes'.61
The CEDAW Committee is one of the few UN bodies that explicitly recognises 
women's right to participate in constitution making and one of the few whose approach 
understands the nexus between constitution drafting and electoral processes. In 2013, 
it set out some of the reasons underlying the low level of women's participation in 
constitution making, pointing out that the design of electoral systems, particularly 
the electoral rules and procedures, 'are not always gender-neutral'. It explains:
Decisions on the choice of electoral systems are important to overcome the 
traditional gender bias that undermines women's participation. Substantive 
progress towards the equal participation of women as candidates and voters as 
well as the holding of free and fair elections will not be possible unless a number 
of appropriate measures are taken, including a gender‑responsive electoral system 
and the adoption of temporary special measures to enhance women's participation 
as candidates … and ensure that women voters and female political candidates 
are not subject to violence either by State or private actors.62
The CEDAW Committee describes 'the introduction of temporary special measures' 
such as gender quotas as one of the 'essential prerequisites to true equality in political 
life'.63 At the UN level, the question of women's equal participation in the conduct of 
public affairs and the need for quotas to achieve this purpose were first raised in 1990 
59 CEDAW Committee, General Comment  No.  30 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Conflict and 
Post‑Conflict Situations, 47th sess, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/30 (1 November 2013) [71].
60 Ibid [70].
61 Ibid [73(a)].




by a resolution of the UN's Economic and Social Council, which set out a target 
of 30 per cent for women in leadership positions by 1995 and equal representation 
by 2000.64 Such measures were reiterated in the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action,65 
but it does not appear that the UN Secretariat endorsed these measures until 2010.66
Since 2010, the UN  has clearly embraced the idea of electoral quotas and 
other temporary special measures to ensure that women participate more fully 
in political decision making, including constitution making.67 It has adopted the 
position that, to ensure women hold public office, international best practice involves 
the use of electoral systems that incorporate proportional representation.68 In 2013, 
the Secretary-General offered global data on the significant number of states that 
have adopted constitutional provisions or legislation regarding such measures.69 The 
report sets out that those countries with electoral quotas elected 25 per cent women 
members of parliament compared with 19 per cent without quotas.70 Furthermore, 
the report explains that the choice of electoral system is critical to women's chances 
of being elected, as 'larger numbers of women are elected under proportional electoral 
systems (24.6 per cent) than under First-Past-the-Post majority or plurality systems 
(18.5 per cent)'.71
At the same time, there is international recognition that, in order to ensure 
that constitutions are implemented and enforced, constitution-making bodies must 
inevitably include appointed members, presumably from either civil society or the 
64 Recommendations and Conclusions Arising from the First Review and Appraisal of the Implementation of 
the Nairobi Forward‑Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women to the Year 2000, ESC Res 1990/15, 
UN ESCOR, 13th plen mtg, Supp No 1, UN Doc E/1990/90 (24 May 1990) Recommendation IV.
65 Fourth World Conference on Women, 4-5 September 1995, Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action, UN Doc A/CONF.177/20 (15 September 1995) [184], [189].
66 Women's Participation in Peacebuilding — Report of the Secretary‑General, 65th  sess, Provisional 
Agenda Item s 28(a) and 122, UN Doc A/65/354-S/2010/466 (7 September 2010) [41]-[44].
67 Ibid. In 2004, Women and Political Participation featured on the GA's agenda but it made no 
specific reference to women's participation in constitutional design or reform despite the UN's  role 
in post-conflict states such as Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. Such matters were not mentioned 
until the GA's second resolution on this issue in late 2011 — see Women and Political Participation, 
GA Res 66/130, UN GAOR, 66th sess, Agenda Item 28(a), UN Doc A/RES/66/130 (19 March 2012).
68 Strengthening the role of the United Nations in Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic 
and Genuine Elections and the Promotion of Democratization — Report of the Secretary‑General, 66th sess, 
Provisional Agenda Item 69(b), UN Doc A/66/314 (19 August 2011) [41]-[42].
69 Measures Taken and Progress Achieved in the Promotion of Women and Political Participation — 
Report of the Secretary‑General, 68th sess, Provisional Agenda Item 28, UN Doc A/68/184 (24 July 2013) 
[31]-[32].





political elite, and that women should figure among these appointments. This is 
indicated in the 2011 UN General Assembly Resolution on Women and Political 
Participation, which addresses the need for states to ensure an expanded role for 
women in peacebuilding efforts, and thus it 'encourages states to appoint women 
to posts within all levels of their Governments, including, where applicable, bodies 
responsible for designing constitutional … reforms'.72 While this may be counter to the 
ideals of inclusiveness and participation associated with new constitutionalism, it 
may lead to the appointment of women members who are not as indebted to party 
structures as those women who are elected through the party system. The next section 
of this chapter thus traces the experiences of women delegates in Timor-Leste and 
Afghanistan in order to examine whether it is arguable that appointed women may 
be better placed than women who have been elected through the electoral system to 
respond to the women's charters presented by civil society.73
UN Practice in Timor‑Leste and Afghanistan
The need for temporary special measures to ensure women's participation in elections 
and hence constitution drafting has been contested over time. This is highlighted by 
the UN's experiences in offering constitutional assistance in Timor-Leste (2001-02) 
and Afghanistan (2002-04).
In  2001, at the time of the UN  Transitional Administration in East 
Timor  (UNTAET), there was a disagreement between various UN  agencies as to 
whether the UN Transitional Administrator  (TA) for Timor-Leste should adopt a 
regulation imposing a mandatory 30 per cent quota for women on the political party 
lists for the UN-run elections for the Constituent Assembly  (CA). This body was 
tasked with drafting and adopting the state's first constitution, and with conducting 
a week-long public participation programme, before becoming Timor-Leste's first 
elected parliament. Prior to this, the TA had imposed various quotas for women's 
representation in Timor-Leste: for example, the TA  had imposed a 50  per  cent 
quota for women in development councils at the village and sub-district level and 
a 30 per cent quota for women in public administration. The proposal for a quota 
system for the  CA was initially advocated by the Timorese National Council, a 
quasi-legislature appointed by the TA, as well as Rede Fete, a network of Timorese 
72 Women and Political Participation, GA  Res  66/130, UN  GAOR, 66th  sess, Agenda Item  28(a), 
UN Doc A/RES/66/130 (19 March 2012) [7]-[8] (emphasis added).
73 This dual focus on the need to ensure that women can be elected and appointed to public bodies 
is evident in some constitutional texts such as that of Ecuador, which in 2007 entrenched a principle 
of parity in order to ensure women's equal participation in public bodies. Like Tunisia, Ecuador has 
legislated candidate quotas in which a strict alternation between female and male candidates at national 
and/or sub-national levels is required by law.
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women's organisations. It was to operate in relation only to seventy-five of the 
eighty-eight seats which were to be contested through a proportional system; it would 
not affect the other thirteen seats contested on a First-Past-The-Post basis. It appears 
that the proposal was supported by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, UNIFEM and UN  Division on the Advancement of Women, but it was 
blocked by the Electoral Affairs Division of UNTAET on advice from the Political 
Affairs Division at UN headquarters. The latter argued:
UNTAET has exclusive responsibility for holding free and fair elections in 
East Timor … [and] … while some countries do have quotas for women (and 
for other groups), other democratic countries vehemently oppose the practise. 
This would include some members of the Security Council … Electoral quotas 
for women (or any other group) do not constitute international best practice for 
elections.74
In the end, the Timorese National Council backed down from its position. 
Despite the absence of any formal quotas imposed by the TA for the CA, Timorese 
women won 27 per cent of the seats. While most parties placed women in winnable 
positions, the second-largest political party failed to include any women on its 
candidate list. According to expert Michele Brandt, strict party-line voting meant 
that 'few [elected women in the CA] attempted to advance provisions that women's 
groups had put forward in a charter submitted to the Constituent Assembly'.75 As 
a consequence, the Women's Charter,76 prepared by Timorese women's NGOs as a 
means of engaging with the constitutional process, was largely ignored.
While the UN's involvement in Afghanistan, from 2002 onwards, was much 
lighter than its territorial administration of Timor-Leste, its constitutional assistance 
was arguably more targeted and effective in Afghanistan, in particular with respect to 
its advice regarding the constitution-making process.77 In contrast to Timor-Leste, 
in Afghanistan's constitution-making process a quota was imposed for women's 
inclusion in all three of its constitution-making bodies. Afghan women comprised 
approximately 20 per cent of the nine-member Drafting Committee (an appointed 
body which produced the first draft), the thirty-five-member Constitutional 
Commission (an appointed body which was tasked with conducting public 
74 Quoted in Milena Pires, 'East Timor and the Debate on Quotas' in International IDEA, The 
Implementation of Quotas: Asian Experiences (Quota Workshop Report Series, No 1, International IDEA, 
25 September 2002) 36, 38 (emphasis added).
75 Michele Brandt, Constitutional Assistance in Post‑Conflict Countries. The UN Experience: Cambodia, 
East Timor and Afghanistan (United Nations Development Program, 2005) 16.
76 See 'Women's Charter of Rights in East Timor', The La'o Hamutuk Bulletin (Dili, East 
Timor, August 2001) 2 <http://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2001/Aug/bullv2n5.pdf>.
77 Michele Brandt, Constitutional Assistance in Post‑Conflict Countries. The UN Experience: Cambodia, 
East Timor and Afghanistan (United Nations Development Program, 2005) 25-7.
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consultations) and the Constitutional Loya Jirga  (CLJ) (a predominantly elected 
body which had the role of deciding on, and adopting, the final draft). A Presidential 
Decree set a quota for women's representation on the CLJ: its composition included 
5 per cent appointed women (half of the appointed members) as well as sixty-four 
women elected by women.78
Although this number fell below the demand for 'equal representation of 
women' made by a group of Afghan women's NGOs in a Women's Charter,79 a 
document which was used to lobby the President and  CLJ, it was nevertheless a 
significant achievement. In making such demands, Afghan women's NGOs enjoyed 
support from the international community. In the lead-up to the  CLJ, in  2002, 
the UN  Secretary-General flagged that Afghan authorities may be called upon to 
'ensure full support for the participation of women' in the Loya Jirga and 'apply 
temporary special measures, including targets and quotas, targeted at Afghan women 
to accelerate the de facto equality of women and men in decision-making'.80 This 
advocacy of gender quotas may have also influenced the constitutional entrenchment 
of gender quotas for Afghanistan's two legislative houses.
Overall, Afghanistan's constitutional process has been generally perceived as a 
success, in particular for women. For example, Brandt argues:
The representative nature of the CLJ is in part, what allows most Afghans to 
view the final constitution as a positive step toward democratic governance 
despite flaws in the participatory process. While diverse voices and opinions, 
including those of minority groups, may not have been reflected in the draft 
constitution, the representation of minorities and women in the Constitutional 
Loya Jirga led to revisions to the draft that reflected their concerns (such as quotas 
for women's representation in the legislature and recognition of minority 
languages). These groups, to a certain degree, were perhaps better able to 
advocate for the aspirations of their constituencies because the civic education 
and consultation process facilitated the delegates to be better informed about 
constitutional issues and how they related to their rights.81
Brandt is one of the experts who authored Interpeace's Constitution‑Making 
Handbook, which, among other things, offers a comparison of the constitution-making 
processes in Timor-Leste and Afghanistan and is broadly critical of the efforts of 
78 Ibid 20.
79 This Charter was entitled 'Afghan Women's Bill of Rights' see Item 13 (on file with author).
80 Discrimination against Women and Girls in Afghanistan — Report of the Secretary‑General [to the 
Commission on the Status of Women], 46th sess, Provisional Agenda Item 3(a), UN Doc E/CN.6/2002/5 
(28 January 2002) 17, para 69(a), (i).
81 Michele Brandt, Constitutional Assistance in Post‑Conflict Countries. The UN Experience: Cambodia, 
East Timor and Afghanistan (United Nations Development Program, 2005) 21 (emphasis added).
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the international community.82 One factor identified by the Handbook is the 
international community's tendency to view elected bodies as the most legitimate 
bodies to prepare and adopt a constitution. This is illustrated through Timor-Leste's 
constitution-making experience, which, at the urging of UN officials, was performed 
by an elected body. Unfortunately, these elections were dominated by one political 
party and the outcome was that the elected body adopted a pre-prepared draft which 
has been viewed as a one-party constitution. Thus, the Handbook argues, the large 
percentage of women delegates in the Timorese Constituent Assembly had little impact 
on the final outcome.83 In contrast the Handbook refers to the constitution-making 
process in Afghanistan where an appointed constitutional commission developed a 
draft constitution which was subsequently considered by a predominantly elected 
assembly, the CLJ, whose role was to decide on, and adopt, the Constitution. The 
Handbook argues that women had a greater influence on this constitution-making 
process in Afghanistan than was the case with the Timorese process.84 Brandt attributes 
this elsewhere to the fact that the Afghan women delegates were not 'beholden to 
patriarchal party structures',85 in that they were either appointed or they were voted 
for by women, outside party lines. In contrast, in Timor-Leste, women were placed 
on candidate lists by the largesse of political parties, and thus party loyalties meant 
that they were less able to act independently to advance the appeals articulated in the 
Women's Charter.
UN Practice in Nepal
The UN  record of constitutional assistance in relation to women's inclusion is 
checkered. However, since the constitutions of Timor-Leste and Afghanistan 
were drafted, greater consensus has emerged in the international community, and 
the UN  has developed a more coherent and facilitative approach. Nepal is one 
post-conflict state where this UN approach is apparent. It is possible that the UN's 
experience in Nepal has assisted the organisation to formulate a more consistent and 
nuanced approach to women's participation in constitution making.
In  May  2006, six months before Nepal's Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
in late  2006, Nepal's House of Representatives adopted a resolution calling for 
at least 33  per  cent representation of women in all parts of the state structure. 
82 Michele Brandt, Jill Cottrell, Yash Ghai and Anthony Regan, Constitution‑Making and Reform: 
Options for the Process (Handbook, Interpeace, 9 September 2011) 324-5.
83 Ibid 326.
84 Ibid.
85 Michele Brandt, Constitutional Assistance in Post‑Conflict Countries. The UN Experience: Cambodia, 
East Timor and Afghanistan (United Nations Development Program, 2005) 35, fn xxxix.
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In January 2007, the UN Secretary-General reported to the UN Security Council 
that despite this resolution
the exclusion of women from participation in public life, and so far from the peace 
process, has been almost total. The promise of 33  per  cent representation for 
women in all decision making structures has not been realized in existing peace 
process structures such as the Peace Committee and the Interim Constitution 
Drafting Committee. It is urgent that the Nepalese parties open the door to the 
role that women can and should play in the process, as reflected in Security Council 
resolution 1325 (2000).86
It is possible that this international influence ensured that the resolution of Nepal's 
House of Representatives was transformed into real terms. A gender quota for 
women's candidature in the 2008 elections to Nepal's first Constituent Assembly was 
subsequently set in both the 2007 Interim Constitution87 and electoral legislation, 
and this enabled women's representation to reach 33 per cent. In particular, women 
were successful in winning half of the 335 proportional representation seats, while they 
had less success in relation to the First-Past-The-Post electoral system in which they 
won only 30 of 240 seats. The 601-member Constituent Assembly (CA), 95 per cent 
of which was elected in 2008, was 'hailed as one of the most representative institutions 
of its kind around the world'.88 The CA was tasked with drafting the Constitution 
for Nepal as a 'secular, inclusive and fully democratic state', while also operating as 
Nepal's legislature. An official booklet on Nepal's participatory constitution-making 
process, produced by international and local constitutional experts with the support 
of UNDP, shows the desire to emphasise this as an inclusive and participatory process 
distinct from previous elite processes:
This is Nepal's fifth time drafting a constitution. Previous attempts were written 
by experts. They did not utilize a constituent assembly and were not written in 
an inclusive manner. This may be why they did not last.89
One aspect of Nepal's 'inclusive' process was that it encompassed a significant 
number of women from marginalised and lower castes, whose lives are far removed 
from Nepal's political elite. However, after four years of deliberation the body failed 
to finalise a constitution and hence it was disbanded in 2012. A second Constituent 
86 Report of the Secretary‑General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in Support of its 
Peace Process, UN Doc S/2007/7 (9 January 2007) [20] (emphasis added).
87 Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007), art 63.
88 See CEDAW Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women — Combined Fourth and 
Fifth Reports of States Parties — Nepal, UN Doc CEDAW/C/NPL/4-5 (9 November 2010) 9.
89 Centre for Constitutional Dialogue, Participatory Constitution‑Making Process: Participatory 




Assembly was elected in 2013, with women once again gaining 30 per cent of the 
contested seats.90
According to UNDP's analysis, the highly representative nature of the first 
Constituent Assembly 'added complications to the constitution drafting process', 
as 'getting consensus on the constitution became next to impossible'.91 The failure 
of the first Constituent Assembly led to some 'scepticism about the process of 
constitution-making through an elected and inclusive process'.92 While the main 
bone of contention related to federalism, there were other issues that also made 
consensus difficult, at least one of which related to gender. According to the US State 
Department, '[d]uring the constitution-drafting process, equal citizenship rights for 
women was one of the most contentious and highly politicized problems, with no 
final decisions made'.93
UNDP's constitutional assistance project reflects on women's inclusion in 
Nepal's first Constituent Assembly:
The mere fact of holding seats does not automatically mean that women 
participate equally, or even that they have any significant influence at all … [I]t 
was found that male Constituent Assembly members made many decisions 
during informal sessions that very seldom involved women.94
One of the positive outcomes was the formation of a women's caucus across party 
lines, which contributed to putting women's interests on the political agenda.95 
Overall, the experience made clear that women's inclusion was beneficial even if 
it did not automatically translate into women's full and meaningful participation. 
While these revelations are by no means groundbreaking, as they largely mirror the 
difficulties faced by women delegates in other constitution-making processes,96 
the fact that UNDP has articulated and documented them provides hope that the 
UN will use the experience to help create conditions more conducive to women's 
equal and meaningful participation.
90 Women won  172 of the contested 575  seats. See National Democratic Institute, In Nepal, 
Women Fight to Maintain Seats in the Constituent Assembly (13  March  2014) <https://www.ndi.org/
nepal-women-fight-to-maintain-seats-in-parliament>.
91 UNDP in Nepal, Annual Report 2013 (UNDP, February 2014) 30.
92 Ibid 29.
93 United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Nepal 2013 
Human Rights Report, Executive Summary (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 — 
Nepal, US Department of State, 27 February 2014) 16.
94 UNDP in Nepal, Annual Report 2013 (UNDP, February 2014) 26.
95 Ibid 27.
96 See, for example, Catherine Albertyn, 'Women and the Transition to Democracy in South Africa' 




Despite the introduction in some countries such as Tunisia of gender parity laws 
that attempt to address the equal participation of women in legislatures and, in some 
cases, constitution-making bodies, in modern times South Africa's negotiated Interim 
Constitution represents the first — and only — time so far that a constitution has 
been drafted by equal numbers of men and women. UN  discourse and practice 
indicate that there is an emerging international understanding that not only is there 
a need for women to participate in post-conflict constitution-making processes, but 
also that structural changes must be put in place to ensure that women can enjoy 
this right. One example of such change is the increasing use of proportional electoral 
systems as a means to elect a majority of members for a constitutional drafting body. 
Such systems have been used to elect constitution-making bodies in Nepal, Tunisia 
and Timor-Leste, and, as the first two countries show, a combination of electoral 
gender quotas with a system of proportional representation is most likely to ensure 
women's election to such bodies.
This chapter has briefly traced constitution-making experiences in Timor-Leste, 
Afghanistan and Nepal. The experience of Timor-Leste shows that initiatives for 
women's participation in constitution making arose from the ground up, via civil 
society, only to be pushed back by a lack of consensus within the UN  and the 
international community more broadly. This was not the approach taken by the 
UN in relation to Afghanistan's constitution-making process, where the arrangement 
to allow some women to become members of constitution-making processes outside 
party structures, through being elected only by women or by being appointed, may 
have enabled women members to engage more actively with civil society and women's 
charters. One of the reasons underlying this difference is that the international 
community framed its intervention in Afghanistan in relation to reclaiming women's 
rights following the Taliban's regime of gender apartheid. This framework was assisted 
in part by the UN Security Council's evolving WPS agenda.
In the case of Nepal, the integrity of the Security Council's WPS agenda, 
which by 2006 was gaining some global momentum (at least in rhetoric), was being 
undermined by women's 'almost total'97 exclusion from the Nepalese peace process. 
Thus the UN was under pressure to ensure that Nepalese leaders fulfilled their promise 
regarding women's participation in the Constituent Assembly, and the experience 
has enabled UNDP to gain a stronger understanding of some of the dynamics that 
hamper women's participation, even within constitution-making bodies. Thus the 
challenge for UNDP is to develop and offer strategies to post-conflict states which 
97 Report of the Secretary‑General on the Request of Nepal for United Nations Assistance in Support of Its 
Peace Process, UN Doc S/2007/7 (9 January 2007) [20].
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assist them in ensuring not only that women are included in constitution-making 
bodies but also that they are able to participate meaningfully within such bodies.
Following its experiences in Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Nepal, the UN has, 
since 2010, begun to broadly articulate the need for gender-responsive electoral laws, 
gender quotas and the need to appoint women when it comes to constitution-making 
processes. These strategies need to be reflected in its Guidance Note on Assistance to 
Constitution‑Making Processes, which, unless updated, offers inadequate guidance for 
constitutional assistance performed by UN agencies in post-conflict states. Overall, 
it is difficult to argue that the UN has consistently provided leadership in assisting 
women to participating equally and meaningfully in constitution-making processes. 
This mantle of leadership is often demonstrated by civil society, which is informed in 
some part by feminist scholarship.
Although constitutional assistance is a 'core component of the UN's 
peacebuilding and state-building strategy',98 UN  constitutional assistance has 
evolved very slowly: it has taken more than a quarter of a century for UN agencies 
to begin to understand the symbolic and substantive importance of women's 
participation in constitution making and the obstacles that hinder it. While the 
work of feminist international scholars such as Gardam, as well as Charlesworth and 
Chinkin, has shown much breadth in highlighting the paradigms and challenges 
women experience in conflict and in post-conflict settings, the Security Council has 
conceived its WPS agenda narrowly, so that it fails to take into account some of the 
critical dynamics operating in post-conflict settings when the foundations of states 
are being reformed through constitution-making processes. The next step for the 
UN Security Council's WPS agenda should be to explicitly set out women's right to 
participate in constitution-making processes and to articulate strategies to ensure that 
this participation is equal and meaningful.
98 UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon, 'Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations 
Assistance to Constitution-Making Processes' (Guidance Note, April 2009) 3.
